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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






In re:  CHRISTOPHER HOWARD PAIGE; MICHELE ANNA PAIGE, 
                                                                             Debtors 
 




Christopher Howard Paige;  
Michele Anna Paige, 
                                         Appellants 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court Civil No. 3-17-cv-00023) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 September 12, 2018 
 
BEFORE:  JORDAN, VANASKIE, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 






NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 After granting Christopher and Michele Paige’s motion for judgment on all counts 
following ten days of trial proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court denied their five separate 
motions for sanctions.  They appealed that ruling to the District Court, which affirmed the 
Bankruptcy Court.  Now, they appeal the ruling on sanctions, as well as the Bankruptcy 
Court’s refusal to admit two exhibits into evidence during the hearing on their sanctions 
motions.  We review these rulings for an abuse of discretion.1  We have instructed 
bankruptcy courts that before imposing sanctions, they must “articulate sufficient reasons 
for [their] determination of what is the appropriate sanction to apply,” and “provide a 
sufficient basis for reviewing its exercise of discretion.”2  The Bankruptcy Court has done 
so.  After reviewing the record, the briefing, and the arguments on both sides, and finding 
this appeal to be wholly without merit, we will affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s rulings 
without further discussion. 
 The tone and contents of the Appellants’ briefs, however, do require additional 
commentary.  These filings are striking for their inappropriate tenor, and for the 
scurrilous and degrading language used throughout.  The indecorous nature of 
Appellants’ opening and reply briefs crosses a line of legal decorum and approaches 
actionable behavior.  Our concern began with the Notice of Appeal.  The purpose of such 
a notice “is to notify the court of appeals and the opposing party that an appeal is being 
taken.”3  The notice filed here fulfills that purpose, but inappropriately goes further.  It 
baldly questions our integrity as a Court and labels the District Court as bigoted, 
                                              
1 In re Miller, 730 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2013). 
2 Id. (citation omitted). 
3 Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Mills, 634 F.3d 746, 751 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 
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ascribing lude and derogatory terminology to it as identifiers for the Paiges.4  This 
inappropriate and outlandish commentary continued into their briefing.  As an example, 
Appellant Michele Paige begins the Summary of the Argument section of her brief by 
stating that “[t]he lower courts unlawfully discriminated against my husband and I [sic] 
— implicitly, but unambiguously holding that we are ‘faggots’ and ‘cunts’ with no rights 
that anyone is bound to respect.”5  The District and Bankruptcy Courts never used these 
terms to refer to the Paiges.  Yet both Appellants adopt these vulgar terms for themselves 
throughout their briefs.  And they go further. 
 Christopher Paige calls this Court and the members of our Bar a “cesspool of 
bigots and the jurists who protect them.”6  Michele Paige charges that “[f]or generations, 
the Third Circuit [has] turned away African-Americans, Latinos, [and] gays — anyone 
who did not meet this Circuit’s limited definition of a person.”7  What we have done—for 
generations—is give significant leeway to pro se litigants and their filings.8  We have 
done so here, but the Paiges’ filings are beyond the pale of zealous advocacy.  This is 
                                              
4 The Notice of Appeal states “[W]e respectfully request that the Court of Appeals restore 
the rule of law, the courts’ integrity, and the public’s confidence therein by reversing this 
transparently–ludicrous and blatantly-bigoted Opinion (Dkt. #76) and Order (Dkt. #77), 
which–quite literally–held that “faggots” and “cunts” like my wife and I [sic] are legally 
obligated to settle, rather than litigate, any and all claims against us because we have no 
rights that anyone is bound to respect— not even the right to have our Briefs read before 
our appeals are rejected.”  App. Vol I. at 8.  The crude terminology, apparently, 
originated in certain in-house emails sent by various employees of the Appellees.  See, 
e.g., App. Vol. IV, at 146. 
5 Brief of Appellant Michele Paige at 1 (Paige’s brief restarts its pagination after page 19 
to page 1.  Our citation here is to the second “Page 1” of the brief). 
6 Opening Brief of Christopher Paige at 8 (that is, page 8 appearing after page 12). 
7 Opening Brief of Michele Page at 19 (the second appearance of Page 19 in the 
document, not the first). 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 334 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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especially true given that the Paiges are atypical pro se litigants: both claim law degrees 
from a prestigious law school and other advanced degrees from respected institutions of 
higher education.9 
 As we indicated above, the Paiges’ arguments are wholly without merit and we 
will affirm.  We present this additional commentary only to castigate the Appellants and 
to emphasize the importance we place on proper decorum and professionalism for all 
advocates who appear before us, whether they are pro se, or licensed attorneys.10   
                                              
9 See, e.g., Opening Brief of Christopher Paige at 28 (that is, page 28 following page 12), 
where he admits to being a “Yale Law School educated moron who won awards for brief 
writing”; Opening Brief of Michele Paige at 18 (that is, page 18 following page 12) 
wherein she speaks of attending Harvard Business School and Yale Law School.  Both 
Christopher and Michele Paige acknowledge that they are attorneys—although not 
appearing as such—in the relevant portions of their briefs.  Michele Paige states that her 
Bar status is “immaterial,” denies any Bar membership, and citing this Court’s “tolerance 
of bigotry,” states her disinterest in joining “your corrupt profession.”  Opening Brief of 
Michele Paige, unnumbered page.  Christopher Paige tells us his Bar status is also 
“immaterial.” Opening Brief of Christopher Paige, unnumbered page.  
10 Appellants also assert that “Now we all know you won’t read this Brief . . ..”  Opening 
Brief of Christopher Paige at page 9 (as occurring after page 12).  As you see supra, we 
did. 
